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1. The dismal queen and the science wars
The cultural and epistemic status of science is
under attack. Social and cultural studies of
science are widely perceived to offer evidence
and arguments in support of an anti-science
campaign. They portray science as a mundane
social endeavour, akin to religion and politics,
with no privileged access to truthful information
about the (socially unconstructed) real world.
Science is under threat and needs defence. Old
philosophical legitimations have lost their bite.
Alarm bells ring, new troops have to be
mobilised. Call economics, the good old friend of
the status quo depicting it as a generally
beneficial social order while accommodating a
rather mundane picture of human behaviour. In
contrast to constructivist and relativist sociology of
scientific knowledge, economic accounts of
science seek to provide a rigorous defence of the
cultural and epistemic legitimacy of science by
accommodating plausible elements in the
sociological accounts and by embedding them in
invisible-hand arguments about the functioning of
some market-like structure within science. Viewed
through economic spectacles, science re-emerges
from the ashes as stronger and more beautiful
than ever. A spectator raises an innocent question:
is economics itself strong and beautiful enough to
offer such alleviating services? In order to
examine the emerging issue of disciplinary
credibility, we need to look at economics itself
more closely, and we need to address traditional
issues in the philosophy of science as well as less
traditional issues of reflexivity. We will see that the
above caricature concerning the role of
economics in the science wars calls for heavy
qualifications if not wholesale rejection (no
comment here on the caricatured role of the SSK).
Let us then try a less dramatic and less
streamlined start, one that is initially more neutral
with respect to the science wars, and more focused
on issues that are endogenous to epistemology
and science studies. Knowledge is a product of
social processes. Therefore, epistemology has to
be socialised. No matter what degree of
agreement there is on this claim, it does not yet fix
anything about how to socialise epistemology. An
obvious first step is to suggest that answering this
question requires consulting the relevant sciences
for their contributions to the understanding of the
social aspects of cognition. Just as the
“naturalisation” of epistemology may be taken to
require being informed about the advances of
neuro-sciences, its “socialisation” would require
consulting the social sciences. But again, this
imposes very weak constraints on how to
proceed in the socialisation project. The
multiplicity of possible theoretical resources that
could be mobilised is almost endless. There are
many social sciences, all of them internally
heterogeneous, each with a variety of rival and
complementary theories, methods, and styles of
research. Not only do we have varieties of
general social theory, but there are specialised
fields, schools, traditions, and theoretical
frameworks within political science, sociology,
anthropology, social psychology, legal studies,
socio-linguistics, management research, cultural
studies, communication studies – and economics.
On what grounds are we to choose from among
such options?
In choosing the theoretical resources for the
socialisation of epistemology, one is naturally
constrained by one’s background beliefs and
preferences. If one thinks highly of science,
economics may appear attractive for numerous
reasons: economics offers tools for building an
effective pro-science account, one that rectifies
the epistemic rationality and objectivity of
science; economics itself is a rigorous and
reliable scientific discipline with theoretical and
explanatory powers superior to those of other
social sciences; and given that economics
presents itself as the science that deals with issues
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of scarcity, choice, and trade-off situations, it has
the much needed capacities for systematically
dealing with pressing issues in science policy in
the era of tightening financial constraints. This
optimistic picture depicts a science-based and
science-friendly balance between science as a
subject of social epistemology, economics as the
scientific resource for socialising the epistemology
of science, and contemporary science policy.
None of this will convince those with different
background beliefs and preferences. Definitely
for those with anti-science sentiments, but also for
many of those with moderately sceptical attitudes,
such a picture appears to tell a horror story based
on a self-contained and self-celebrating scientism.
If science in general is suspect, then economics
must be at least as much so, and there is no
justification for setting out to defend a suspect
subject by appealing to a suspect tool.
Indeed, economics is a contested discipline,
inciting conflicting attitudes of assent and
admiration, suspicion and hostility. Perceptions
tend to be polarised between seeing it as a
scientific success story and as a culturally
dangerous failure. Economics is the “queen of the
social sciences” for some, while others view it as
the “dismal science” in one or more senses of this
expression (see Mäki 2002). Where many see
technical rigor, theoretical insight and empirical
success, others find empirically empty intellectual
toy games played by mathematically minded
technicians or politically minded ideologues.
Many are convinced that economics is our best
guide to understanding the conditions of social
co-ordination, efficient use of resources, and
people’s wellbeing, but others are worried about
the increasing adoption of its suspiciously narrow
and distorting worldviews as part of the
questionable cultural trend of economisation,
marketisation, monetisation and commodification
of our social lives at large. The “dismal queen” is
able to trigger hopes as well as horrors. (See e.g.
Mayer 1993; Reder 1999; Colander 1991)
A related observation that helps put
economics on the intellectual map points out its
expansionist tendencies. Economic concepts and
principles and styles of inquiry are increasingly
employed in the study of phenomena that lie
beyond the boundaries of the traditional domains
of economics. This has changed disciplines such
as political science, sociology, and law. Indeed,
economics is an expansionist discipline, disrespectful
for traditional disciplinary boundaries. Philosophy
is not innocent either, it is on the list of disciplines
increasingly influenced by economic ideas. This
has been obvious in areas such as political and
moral philosophy, and nowadays no less so in
epistemology and philosophy of science. The
“economisation” of philosophy is just a special
case of its “scientisation”. All of this is a matter of
hopes of scientific unification for some, horrors of
intellectual imperialism for others.
The epistemological adaptations of economic
ideas are not of a recent origin, but it is only
recently that the use of economics as a resource
for social epistemology and philosophy of
science has become a growing industry, as
witnessed by various bodies of work, such as
Bartley (1982), Goldman (1999), Goldman and
Shaked (1991), Kitcher (1991, 1993), Luetge
(2004), Rescher (1989, 1996), Strevens (2003),
Zamora (1999, 2002a, 2002b), and others (for
overviews, see Hands 1997, 2001). Unsurprisingly,
these developments have been accompanied by
a series of criticisms (e.g, Hands 1995, 1997;
Mirowski 1996, 1997; Roorda 1997; Sent
1997; Ylikoski 1995).
I find this body of literature fascinating and
challenging for many reasons, including the fact
that there is a surprising (and inspiring) gap in it:
the absence of a systematic examination of
economics itself as a resource for socialising
epistemology. One would expect to see
consultations of the vast literature in the philosophy
and social studies of economics as part of such
an examination. This expectation is reinforced by
the recognition of the deep and extensive
controversies over the status of economics as a
scientific discipline, and over the economisation
of our culture more generally. Indeed, one would
expect to find some discussion on how to set out
to provide a normative assessment and
justification of the use of this or that economic
theory (or more generally the dominant economic
style of modelling) as a resource in the philosophy
of knowledge and science. The challenge is to
assess the credibility of economics.
The obvious way to go in looking for such a
normative account is based on the recognition
that in order to assess the credentials of economic
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epistemology we need to appeal to the
epistemology of economics – including the social
and economic epistemology of economics. If one
wants to be justified in choosing to view science
as an economy, this implies a call for gauging
economics as a science – including economics as
an economy. Intriguing issues of normativity and
reflexivity emerge. While the focus here is on the
“economisation” of epistemology, it is clear that
analogical issues arise in other branches of
science-informed epistemology.
Before dealing with these questions in more
detail, I will briefly point out the heterogeneity
and flexibility of economics as a source of ideas,
with variable implications for the economic
epistemology of science. While many models in
economic epistemology invoke something like the
invisible hand with apparently science-friendly
implications, economics is in no way
predetermined to yield those implications only: it
has a rich set of theoretical resources with flexible
uses. Some of the horrors alleviated, some of the
hopes circumscribed.
2. Economic epistemology and the plurality of
invisible hands
Economics may enter epistemological investigat-
ions in a number of ways, but only some of them
are directly relevant to social epistemology (the
issue of whether economics has a deep enough
notion of the social is ignored here). Many of
those ways that are relevant, are expected to
contribute to social epistemology conceived as
the study of the reliability of various social
mechanisms and processes in the generation of
knowledge. Perhaps the most striking contribution
of economics to social epistemology is the
adaptation to another sphere of one of the most
important insights of economic thought since
Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith. The key
social mechanism we find in economics is that of
the generous invisible hand: individuals in
interaction with one another may bring about
beneficial aggregate consequences without
aiming at those consequences. The paradigm of
this idea envisages individuals driven by their self-
interest in the market for goods and services, and
their interactions bringing about the maximum
possible social welfare for all as an unintended
consequence: private vices, public virtues. This is
a powerful notion that economic epistemologists
may use in seeking to accommodate both the
traditional epistemic virtues of science and many
of the plausible insights offered by the sociology
of scientific knowledge.
This is probably why economic epistemology
appears to many as decisively pro-science, telling
a story of epistemically under-motivated (or un-
motivated) behaviour with an epistemically happy
end. The contrast with traditional philosophical
images and recent SSK portrayals of science is
often perceived along the following radically
simplifying lines. Traditional philosophy of science:
private epistemic virtues –> public epistemic virtues.
SSK: private epistemic vices –> public epistemic
vices. Economic epistemology: private epistemic
vices –> public epistemic virtues.
The invisible-hand argument about science
may permit individual scientists to pursue non-
epistemic goals, even predominantly. The outcomes
of collective interactions between the individuals
may be epistemically honourable, by virtue of the
functioning of certain co-ordination mechanisms
within the (market-like) institutions of science.
These then are indeed thought to be among the
social mechanisms that reliably channel scientists’
activities such that knowledge and its
advancement will be attained as an outcome.
While Bartley (1982) and Hull (1988) make
rather straightforward use of a strong notion of
invisible hand in the scientific context,
philosophers like Kitcher and Goldman are more
qualified in their accounts.
Goldman and Shaked (1991) examine the
consequences of scientists pursuing their
professional interests for truth-acquisition in
science. They assume that scientists act like sellers
and buyers in a market, exchanging scientific
products – even though the “analogy with the
marketplace is imperfect” (31). Using various
assumptions about scientists’ behaviour they build
models that show that there is no incompatibility
between credit-motivation and truth-acquisition,
and that under certain conditions, credit-
motivation fosters truth-acquisition (even though it
does not serve truth-acquisition quite as well as
truth-motivation). The authors are explicit about
their results running counter to the presumption
attributed to the SSK that individual pursuits of
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reputation and credibility undermine hopes of
attaining truths about the world.
Kitcher’s account is more complex. In a series
of formal models in Chapter 8 of The
Advancement of Science, he explores various
social arrangements under which credit-seeking,
authority, and competition have varying epistemic
consequences. Inspired by evolutionary theory,
he stresses the importance of cognitive diversity
for epistemic progress, and examines the
conditions of such diversity in a community of
scientists. The picture that emerges is that an
epistemically successful community must have a
substantial proportion of “sullied” agents as its
members (those who are driven by considerations
of credibility and priority). A community with only
epistemically pure (knowledge-motivated) agents
or with only epistemically sullied agents will not
succeed in ensuring sufficient degrees of
cognitive diversity that is required for progress in
capturing significant truths about the world. The
general conclusion in Kitcher’s words:
The very factors that are frequently thought of
as interfering with the (epistemically well-
designed) pursuit of science – the thirst for
fame and fortune, for example – might actually
play a constructive role in our community
epistemic projects, enabling us, as a group, to
do far better than we would have done had
we behaved as independent epistemically
pure individuals. (Kitcher 1993, p. 351)
Such conclusions, and the models that suggest
them, tend to bolster the perception of economics
having been called for help to restore the image
of science as an epistemically successful
objective and rational endeavour. But the contents
of economics is in no way pre-programmed to
yield only such pro-science services in the science
wars. In addition to accounts in terms of a
generous invisible-hand, economics also offers a
store of invisible-backhand accounts. In both, the
outcomes are construed as unintended
consequences of self-seeking individual behaviour.
In one set of arguments, those outcomes are
desirable, in the other they are undesirable. With
small adjustments in the assumptions of models,
the conclusions will be of one kind or of the other.
Examples could be multiplied, but here I will
briefly mention just a couple of examples of recent
theorising that combine individual rational self-
seeking behaviour and collective outcomes that are
suboptimal. In both cases, the epistemological
preference for diversity is violated.
Herd behaviour involving “informational
cascades” conflicts with cognitive diversity (see
e.g. Bannerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch 1992). Economic models of herd
behaviour assume that individuals are rational but
imperfectly informed. Individuals infer to the
missing information by making observations
about other individuals’ behaviour, supposing
others have relevant private information that they
themselves don’t. By assuming that individuals
make sequential decisions and base their
decisions on the observed behaviour of previous
individuals in the sequence, the models show that
this results in a convergence on one single line of
belief and action. Conformity and imitation occur
without any group pressure, coercion, or
sanctions. Mechanisms of positive feedback are
causally sufficient for the phenomenon to arise:
my joining the herd encourages you to join
encourages her to join … The result is that
anybody’s behaviour becomes decreasingly
valuable to others as a source of reliable
information. The likelihood that nobody chooses
the correct option will become non-negligible. A
famous quotation tells the same: “Let them alone:
they be blind leaders of the blind. And if the blind
lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.”
[Matthew 15: 14]
No doubt similar mechanisms are in operation
also in scientific interactions. Imperfectly informed
scientists imitate other scientists driven by the
belief that those others are in possession of
information they don’t have. In such situations,
there is no cognitive diversity and no epistemically
generous invisible hand in operation to support
the collective discovery of truth. This has
immediate implications for the role of epistemic
trust in social epistemology. Knowledge acquisition
of the kind we recognise in our scientific and
other lives would be impossible without epistemic
trust, but trust comes with a risk. The
trustworthiness of any cognitive agent is not easy
to judge, also because complete sincerity can go
along with complete error as the notion of
informational cascades indicates.
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Models of network externalities and path
dependency add more social contents to these
considerations. Again, individual agents in
interaction are assumed to rationally seek their
self-interest. Accidental and perhaps very small
historical events may put in motion a process that
takes a direction that is dependent on the
historical path itself, rather than on any
equilibrating negative feedback mechanism set to
generate a collectively optimal outcome.
Network externalities provide the mediating
positive feedback mechanism that generates a
cumulative process: similar choices by a growing
number of individuals create mutually beneficial
networks between them, and individuals make
those similar choices in order to be able to join
those networks. The bad news is that those
outcomes may be collectively suboptimal. Even
worse, there may be a lock-in such that by
individually rational behaviour alone, there is no
way to get away from those suboptimal
equilibria. The major examples of path-
dependent processes mediated by network
externalities and resulting in suboptimal outcomes
come from technology (such as the QWERTY
keyboard, VCR video system, and PC computers;
see David 1985; Arthur 1989).
Again, it is obvious that similar mechanisms
may be in operation in science. An accidental
historical event and a suitable self-fortifying
mechanism may give direction to research for
long periods of time. One after another,
individual researchers join the crowd, motivated
by the forthcoming network externalities: sharing
a research agenda and standards of judgement,
citing others so as to get cited oneself, having an
audience and being recognised as a serious
scientist, having access to publication outlets and
funding, and so forth. Once a network start
forming in a cumulative fashion, it is not rational
for self-seeking individuals not to join it. But in
analogy with technological trajectories, path-
dependent processes in science may result in
epistemically suboptimal outcomes. For long
periods, science may be stuck to wrong tracks.
Naturally, modelling such a scenario requires a
set of definite assumptions that can be challenged
and changed.
The upshot is that economics is sufficiently
heterogeneous and flexible to offer resources for
deriving almost any conclusions about the
epistemic successfulness of science. Economic
epistemology seems intrinsically neither pro- or
anti-science. Hopes and horrors qualified.
3. What economic models do: From actual to
possible science
The question arises as to the nature and functions
of economic models, whether in their traditional
domains or transmuted into accounts about
science. A moment’s reflection on the function of
models will reveal an obvious but under-
emphasised feature of (much of) economic
epistemology. An implication of this feature is
worth noting: The move from social-constructivist
accounts to economic accounts of science has
not only been a matter of moving to different
answers concerning the status of science, but this
shift in answers may have required a shift in the
questions asked. In considering this possibility,
we shall also get a sharper view of the precise
contents of those answers.
So what is this feature of economic models?
What do models deliver? One service that many
theoretical models in economics provide is to
envisage possibilities. They help answer
explanatory questions of the form: how could an
actual phenomenon P have possibly come about?
The model does not tell us how P actually did
come about, but rather sketches a possible
scenario in which P could in principle come
about. The functionalist variation suggests that P
possibly occurs due to its capacity to serve some
useful function. If P is not actually in place (or if
one is agnostic about whether it is), the model
may help us identify mechanisms and other
conditions that have the capacity to bring it
about. Or, in the functionalist mode, if P were in
place, it would serve a useful function. This is to
say theoretical models in economics
characteristically offer how-possibly or why-
possibly explanations. They describe what
happens or is the case in the model world rather
than in the actual real world. Supposing this is
also a feature of models in economic
epistemology, and supposing that many social-
constructivist accounts of science are concerned
with science as it is actually practised, it follows
that the economic accounts are not to be
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understood as direct rivals to those constructivist
accounts. Their services are limited. They answer
different questions that many would find more
modest. Hopes need to be adjusted accordingly.
The affinities between the styles of reasoning
in theoretical economics and in analytic
philosophy of science and knowledge are
perhaps close enough to have made the
adoption of economic models smooth and easy
for philosophers. But the issue of justification is
pressing. The models in economic epistemology
are supposed to be science-based models about
science. Just as when dealing with models in
science ordinary philosophical issues arise
concerning how those models relate to the real
world, similar issues arise regarding models in
economic epistemology. These are the standard
issues of realism and antirealism, reference and
truth, structure and functions of models, role of
idealisations and simplifications, explanatory
mode and power. The models of economic
epistemology are philosophically puzzling: how
do we get from the models to the world – from
science as it is portrayed in models to science as
it is practised in reality? Economic epistemology
should put these higher order issues on the
philosophical agenda.
Suppose a given model in economic
epistemology says there is a possible social world
in which science is so organised that relatively
reliable truth acquisition or epistemic progress
takes place. But is there a passage from the
possible to the actual? Many uses of several
popular arguments in contemporary philosophical
debates about science would require this move,
such as inference to the best explanation,
pessimistic induction, actual scientific progress as
truth approximation, and indeed many arguments
that seek to demarcate instances of science from
instances of non-science: they are mostly
presented as being concerned with the actual
mechanisms of actual science. In case philosophy
of science is not supposed to make any claims
about actual science, the move is not needed, but
then its agenda is to be understood differently. It
would only pass judgements of the form, “If
science were organized so and so, it would be
relatively reliable in the pursuit of knowledge”.
This sort of counterfactual epistemology could be
cast so as to connect with the practical purposes
of institutional design: the task would be to design
the academic institutions of science so as to
maximise the likelihood of successful attainment of
knowledge, and it would be up to social
epistemology to pass recommendations about
optimal design. That this opportunity may not be
available yet is suggested by Kitcher who very
perceptively wants to “caution against
overinterpreting my results: although my analyses
reveal neglected epistemic possibilities, they are
far too idealized to enable us to be confident in
reaching conclusions about practical strategies
for (say) funding research. Perhaps that can come
later.” (1993, 305; original emphasis)
Economic epistemologists indicate awareness
of all this. In Kitcher’s Chapter 8, a new model is
characteristically introduced by “Let us consider a
community…” where this community is defined in
terms of a number of explicit and implicit
assumptions of the various properties of the
members of the community and their relationships.
To examine that community is to examine a
model. And to examine a model is to examine a
possible scenario. Kitcher is explicit about having
sacrificed realisticness in pursuing precision in his
models. “My toy scientists do not behave like real
scientists, and my toy communities are not real
communities.” (1993, 305) Yet, that sacrifice
comes in degrees and can be diminished. Just as
often happens in economic modelling, Kitcher
moves from simpler models that exclude important
factors to more complex models that incorporate
them, by relaxing some of the idealising
assumptions in the former – and he explicitly says
this is what he does (1993, 357ff). The series of
models in Kitcher’s Chapter 8 often aims at
examining what happens when this or that
idealising assumption is relaxed (such as moving
from communities of homogeneously sullied or
pure agents to mixed communities). Just as in
economic modelling generally, only a few such
steps are taken, and the modified models still
describe abstract possibilities in idealised model
worlds.
The wording used by Goldman and Shaked
indicates similar awareness of the nature of their
intellectual exercise: “In this paper we explore the
assumption that scientists … engage in activities
primarily in the attempt to advance their
professional interests. … We do not claim that
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professional success is the sole motive of scientists
… it is worth considering what its ramifications
would be for the truth-getting propensities of
science” (1991, 31; emphases added, except
‘is’). They set out to demonstrate that there is “no
necessary incompatibility between the goal of
professional success and the promotion of truth
acquisition” (32; emphasis added). Characteristic
commentaries are attached to the exercise, such
as saying that an otherwise inaccurate
assumption (such as the assumption that earning
credit is a matter of changing other agents’
subjective probabilities) is adopted as “a
tolerable first approximation” (34), and that for
the sake of simplicity certain real factors (such as
critical speech acts) are neglected (38). There are
many more such assumptions and commentaries
(see Sent 1997).
Based on examinations of the properties of
models, one can make precise claims about what
happens or is the case in this or that model, under
these or those assumed conditions. Claims about
what is the case in a model can then be taken to
imply claims about what is possibly the case in
the real world (provided the model meets some
conditions of de re possibility). But no claims are
implied by these exercises about what is actually
the case in the real world. We should add that
even the possibility claims are far from evident as
suggested by the serious criticisms that have been
levelled against Kitcher’s and Goldman’s models
(Roorda 1997; Sent 1997).
How exactly do such economic models
contribute to social epistemology, conceived as
the study of the reliability of various social
practices and mechanisms in the generation of
knowledge? This is hard to tell as the authors of
those models have not articulated any systematic
accounts of these models. Many economic
models can be viewed as theoretical laboratories
in which (thought) experiments are conducted,
and mechanisms are isolated. The claim is then
sometimes made that those same mechanisms are
in operation also outside the theoretical
laboratory of the model (see e.g. Sugden 2002;
Mäki 2005). Likewise, one might view the
models of economic epistemology as describing
economic mechanisms in science, accompanied
by the claim that roughly similar mechanisms are
in operation in real-world science; or else those
mechanisms are not yet there but can be
designed and then implemented in real-world
science. An attractive further possibility would be
to suggest that the various models isolate different
mechanisms that conjoin, and sometimes conflict,
in generating actual outcomes of collective
interactive behaviour of scientists, but none of
them may dominate the actual composite
process. But it is not clear that any of these
possibilities is actually entertained in (at least
some important parts of) economic epistemology.
At any rate they are not systematically articulated
and defended.
So what might economic epistemology
manage to deliver – and where does it stand in
contemporary debates over the epistemic and
cultural status of science? It seems the strongest
claim its models can be used to make in this
context is this: individual actions motivated by
non-epistemic goals and subjected to social
pressures do not necessarily undermine the
capacity of science to attain knowledge and to
make epistemic progress; or, it is possible for
science to exhibit the traditional epistemic virtues
even though individual scientists are not
epistemically virtuous. What the arguments in
support of these claims might at most manage to
accomplish is to block any rival arguments that
straightforwardly infer from private vices to public
vices, from epistemically non-pure individual
aspirations to the failure of science to attain
knowledge and make epistemic progress. No
doubt this would be a remarkable contribution to
the controversies over the status of science. But it
is a limited contribution. No claim has been
made or implied or supported regarding science
as it is actually practised. These possibility claims
of economic epistemology are compatible with
claims to the effect that actual science is a
politically and commercially corrupt epistemic
failure. Hopes and horrors, both.
4. Issues of credibility and reflexivity:
Epistemology (including economic
epistemology) of economics
Whatever claims about science are made using
economic models, none of them should convince
those parties in the science wars who are inclined
not to think highly of science in the first place.
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Those claims about science are made in terms of
(social) scientific theories and models. If science is
found dubious, then by implication any science-
based epistemology about science is also viewed
as dubious (and an economics-based
epistemology might be viewed as particularly
dubious). The question is about the credibility and
justification of the scientific resource that is used
for socialising epistemology. If economics is used
as such a resource, how are we to judge its
credibility? This is a challenge that economic
epistemology must meet (just as it has to be met
when using sociology as a resource). The chronic
debate over the credentials of economics as a
scientific discipline must be performed also in
relation to the economic accounts of science.
Economic epistemology implies a call for the
epistemology of economics. (Cf. Mirowski 1996;
Hands 1997; Mäki 1999.)
Recent work in the philosophy of economics
has argued that economics does not satisfy
certain criteria of scientificity: its theories are
unfalsifiable; its research programmes do not
exhibit Lakatosian progress; and the discipline
does not generate predictive progress. Others
reject such criteria of demarcation, or reject the
relevance of the issue of demarcation itself. Most
commentators are concerned about how the very
simple theoretical models based on radically
false idealising assumptions should be assessed;
some adopt an instrumentalist conception, while
others argue for a realist interpretation of such
models, subject to some further conditions. Views
are divided as to what those models are able to
deliver. Is there a sense in which they might be
true? Do they conceivably explain, and if so,
what and how? Do they predict? It is also not
clear what exactly is being accomplished when a
theoretical model is associated with an economic
experiment or with an econometric model.
The key issue can be recast as an issue in
social epistemology: Does the industrial
organisation and the associated incentive
structure of the discipline of economics support
serious fact-finding research or mathematical
games with fictional toy models? Is economic
inquiry so organised that it functions as a reliable
source of knowledge about important social
mechanisms? This gives rise to reflexivity issues in
the economic epistemology of economics.
Given the heterogeneity of economics, there
are many possible ways to go in doing economics
of economics. Zamora (2002b) applies his
constitutional economics approach that examines
the emergence of scientific norms and the way
they shape the goals and behaviour of
economists. It is well known that the norms
governing economic inquiry are extremely severe,
allowing for little variation or flexibility in the style
of research performance. Zamora argues that the
academic norms setting the incentives in
economic research are such that accepting a
model as a good one does not imply accepting
the model as (even approximately) correct.
Goodness of a model is often more a matter of its
builder exhibiting a mastery of mathematical skills
(370-371). The originator of constitutional
political economy, Nobel Laureate James
Buchanan makes a similar observation, without
an explicit economic argument: “Persons who
choose to become economists, at the century’s
end, are those who are attracted by the analytical
properties of the models manipulated rather than
by the success or failure of such models in offering
improved understanding of economic reality”
(1999, 9). It is notable that while Buchanan here
makes a straightforward empirical claim,
Zamora, having developed an explicit economic
argument, avoids making such empirical claims
about the actual situation in economics: “only the
conceptual possibility of epistemic inefficiencies is
indicated” (372).
My reflexivity argument in terms of transaction
cost economics of economics can similarly be
construed as examining a space of possibilities
(Mäki 1999; see also 1993). Using different
theoretical tools, the argument reaches conclusions
similar to those of Zamora. The thrust of the
argument is that economics itself implies that the
most cost-efficient type of economics deals with
mathematical fictions on the blackboard rather
than complex real-world issues. This is a broad
sense of cost-efficiency, in line with the spirit of
social epistemology: transaction costs are
genuinely social costs, they are the costs of an
institutional arrangement. The general idea is that
the most transaction-cost efficient arrangement
will be selected for a given purpose. In the
intellectual and academic context, transaction
costs include the costs of search, communication,
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measurement and monitoring of academic
performance and intellectual quality. These costs
are incurred as we look for a paper to read, a
publication outlet for our own paper, someone to
hire for an academic job; as we measure and
monitor the performance of our peers, a journal,
a university department; as we engage in the
activities of assessment, criticism, utilisation,
awarding, sanctioning, collaboration, debate,
networking. These costs will be lower in case
research is strictly rule governed, highly
standardised and formal instead of informal, only
loosely defined and obscured by real-world
complexities. There is more complexity in the
argument, based on various simplifying
assumptions, but so are all typical economic
arguments. The point is that fiction-oriented
economics modelling possibilities is a more
transaction cost efficient institutional regime than
fact-oriented economics reaching out to the
complex actualities. If broad cost-efficiency were
the determining factor, then the best of economics
should not be relied upon as a source of
knowledge about the world. And social episte-
mology should not rely on the best of economics
in case it were interested in acquiring truthful
information about actual scientific practice.
Hopes and horrors are becoming increasingly
informed and qualified. It should be noted,
however, that thanks to the feature we have
identified in section 3, theoretical economics is
self-consoling. The above exercises in the
economic epistemology of economics only
envisage possibilities, and that is truly harmless
compared to making well established empirical
claims about economics. There is room for other
models that portray economics as possibly
epistemically successful.
5. Further reflexivity issues: Description as
construction
The final sentences of The Advancement of
Science proclaim: “The philosophers have ignored
the social context of science. The point, however,
is to change it.” (Kitcher 1993, 391) In general,
it is easy to agree. But there is a version of this
idea that might be less agreeable.
Consider the recent discussion on whether
economics students are more selfish and whether
this is due to their studies of economics. Frank,
Gilovich, and Regan (1993) set out to investigate
“whether exposure to the self-interest model
commonly used in economics alters the extent to
which people behave in self-interested ways”
(159). They examined charitable donations and
prisoners dilemma experiments, and reported the
finding that economics students were less likely to
co-operate and more likely to defect and free-ride
than others. Among the possible explanations of
this behaviour they mention that due to the
exposure of students to economic models that
assume self-interested behaviour on the part of
agents, they are more likely to construe the
situations in which they are put in self-interested
terms; and they are more likely to expect other
agents to defect, which fortifies their own
inclination to so behave.
A recent Presidential Address to the
Econometric Society suggests that a prominent
game theorist may have been influenced by these
findings: “I am a micro economics teacher. I am
part of a big ‘machine’ which I suspect not only
influence the world but even is brainwashing
students to think in a way which I do not
particularly like.” (Rubinstein 2004, 16) He
shares his doubts about whether economic “toy
models” are able to inform us about the world but
believes that nevertheless “models can have an
enormous influence on the real world, not by
providing advice or by predicting the future, but
rather by influencing culture, that is, the collection
of ideas and conventions which people believe in
and which influence the way they reason and
act” (22).
Similar reflexivity issues arise for economic
epistemology. What if exposure to economic
models of science were to make an impact on
scientists’ behaviour just as they may have
influenced the behaviour of economics students?
What if those models could distort the ideal
proportions between the sullied and pure agents
in Kitcher’s model worlds by triggering excessive
proportions of sullied behaviour in the actual
world? What if the design and imposition of
market-like competitive structures on science will
not only channel some pregiven behavioural
dispositions of scientists, but will also shape those
dispositions to the detriment of science? Horror for
all.
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It is generally believed that rational self-
interested choice explains better in situations
where the agents are acting under the pressure of
competitive markets compared to situations in
which agents are not subjected to such pressures.
For example, rational choice models better
explain the behaviour of business firms than that
of households. This is because the selection
mechanisms of competitive markets force firms to
maximise for survival, while this pressure is mostly
absent in the case of households. This might be
taken to suggest that in the scientific context,
perhaps not all agents are intrinsically either
sullied or pure, but rather potentially either way
(perhaps with stronger and weaker potentials). It
is the circumstances that fortify and trigger and
actualise those potentials. Indeed, what if the
relevant distinction is between sullied and non-
sullied behavioural disposition (rather than pre-
given character or ultimate preference), and what
if publicly describing science in market-like terms
and imposing on it market-like structures will fortify
and trigger increasing proportions of sullied
dispositions? This is a different image from that of
Kitcher: in his account, individual motives are
given and only channelled by social institutions.
On the image suggested here, some such motives
may be weak and dormant but reinforced and
awakened by social institutions and situations.
My speculative provocation suggests that while
models like those of Kitcher may indeed have the
potential for changing the social context of
science, they may also have self-destructive
potential. This is because they may have science-
destructive potential. Horror throughout.
This calls for a final consolation. If describing
science in economic terms were to make a
difference for what is being described, wouldn’t
the same hold for describing it in, say,
sociological terms? And how do we tell which
construction-by-description is more science-
friendly? After all, economic and sociological
accounts share much of the relevant vocabulary,
terms such as credit, reputation, recognition,
priority, authority. And one may want to indicate
that economics is more than avaricious egotism in
competitive markets (while lamenting that this
perspective may still dominate the disciplinary
culture). The range of theoretical resources
available in economics is increasing in richness
as it is making serious attempts to model situations
that contain co-operation, norms, values, trust,
reciprocity, fairness, emotions and moral motivation.
Economics is a controversial discipline, but it is
also a heterogeneous and evolving resource for
social epistemology.
In order to exploit its resources in a responsible
and more deeply science-friendly manner,
economics has to be philosophically monitored.
Reciprocity suggests, and is supported by the
speculations (of possibility) in this essay, that
philosophy itself must be scientifically (and
philosophically) monitored.
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